Abstract. We present a notion of realizability and a functional interpretation in the context of intuitionistic logic, both incorporating nonstandard principles. The functional interpretation that we present corresponds to the intuitionistic counterpart of an interpretation given recently by Ferreira and Gaspar. It has also some similarities with an interpretation given by B. van den Berg et al. but replacing finiteness conditions by majorizability conditions. Nonstandard methods are often regarded as nonconstructive. Our interpretations intend to seek for constructive aspects in nonstandard methods in the spirit of recent papers on extensions of Peano and Heyting arithmetic.
Introduction
Nonstandard methods are often regarded as nonconstructive. Nevertheless, in the past few years there has been a growing interest in trying to make explicit constructive aspects of nonstandard methods with the use of functional interpretations. Particularly interesting for us are [2] and [7] (building on previous work by Palmgren [14] [15], Moerdijk [13] , Avigad and Helzner [1] and recent papers by Van den Berg and Sanders [3] [18] ). In that spirit we present a notion of realizability and a functional interpretation in the context of intuitionistic logic, both incorporating nonstandard principles. We also prove soundness and characterization theorems for both the bounded nonstandard realizability and the intuitionistic nonstandard functional interpretation.
Realizability is a method created by Kleene [11] , which makes explicit the constructive content of arithmetical sentences by providing witnesses to existential quantifiers and disjunctions. The notion of realizability presented in this paper is based on the bounded modified realizability [8] and includes nonstandard objects and principles. As the name suggets, the bounded modified realizability is a modification of realizability which relies on intensional majorizability and provides (upper) bounds instead of precise witnesses. Our notion of realizability has also similarities with the Herbrand realizability presented in [2, Section 4] . This is due to the fact that the Herbrand realizability provides a finite set in which there is an element that may serve as a witness. As such one may see both majorizability and the finite set of Herbrand realizability as methods that provide nonprecise witnesses.
In a recent paper, Ferreira and Gaspar [7] showed how the bounded functional interpretation [9] can be recast without intensional notions by going to a wider nonstandard setting. This was carried out in the classical setting. Both the bounded modified realizability and the bounded functional interpretation rely on the Howard/Bezem notion of strong majorizability. The functional interpretation that we present corresponds to the intuitionistic counterpart of the interpretation given by Ferreira and Gaspar. It has also some similarities with an interpretation given in [2] by Van den Berg, Briseid, and Safarik but once again it replaces finiteness conditions by majorizability conditions. All the interpretations mentioned which include nonstandard principles make use of the syntactic approach of E. Nelson's to nonstandard analysis called internal set theory [16] [17] by extending the language with a new unary predicate st(x) to the language which is intended to be read as "x is standard" and giving three axiom schemes called Idealization, Standardization and Transfer. As we will see in Section 5 the latter presents some difficulties when dealing with functional interpretations.
In Section 2 we present the basic framework for our interpretations and recall basic notions regarding majorizability and nonstandard analysis. In Section 3 we give a our new notion of realizability, which extends the notion given in [8] to incorporate nonstandard methods. In Section 4 we give our intuitionistic functional interpretation.
Basic framework
Let E-HA ω be the theory of extensional Heyting arithmetic in all finite types. The main purpose of this section is to introduce an extension E-HA ω st of E-HA ω . The theory E-HA ω st is the intuitionistic counterpart of the theory E-PA ω st presented in [7] . The language of this extension extends the language of E-HA ω by having unary predicates st σ for each finite type σ (the predicates for standardness). Note that the terms of both languages remain the same.
The axioms of E-HA ω st are those of E-HA ω together with the standardness axioms and the external induction rule. We start by establishing some notations and making some observations. The Howard/Bezem notion of strong majorizability (introduced in [10] and [4] ) is defined by induction on the finite type:
For further details on this notion see [6] [12] . In [12] the notation y s-maj σ x is used instead of our x ≤ * y. Strong majorizability is transitive but not reflexive in general (except for the base type 0). An element x σ is said to be monotone if x ≤ * σ x. It can be proved that if x majorizes some element, then x is monotone. With the exception of types 0 and 1, it is not set-theoretically true that every element is majorizable. However, an important theorem, called Howard's majorizability theorem, says that for every closed term t σ of the language there is a closed term q σ such that t ≤ * σ q [10] . This result will play a central role in the interpretations presented in this paper.
A formula is called internal if it is part of the original language of E-HA ω (i.e., the standard predicates st do not occur in the formula). Otherwise it is called external. We follow the convention of Nelson in [16] and will use lower case Greek letters to denote internal formulas and upper case Greek letters to denote a formula which can be internal or external. Therefore, the axioms of E-HA ω are only constituted by internal formulas. Note, also, that the equality and majorizability relations are given by internal formulas. The universal quantifiers ∀ st x σ ,∀x σ and∀ st x σ are abbreviations of the universal quantifier relativized to the standard elements, to the monotone elements and, simultaneously, to the standard and monotone elements (respectively). We use similar abbreviations for the existential quantifier. Bounded quantifications of the form ∀x ≤ * σ t (. . .) are defined in the usual way and come in three varieties as well.
We are now ready to state the axioms of E-HA ω st that involve external formulas. The standardness axioms are:
); where the types σ and τ are arbitrary. The external induction rule is
• From Φ(0) and
(External induction is formulated as a rule just as a matter of convenience. Since there is no restriction in the formulas Φ, the rule is equivalent to the corresponding axiom scheme.) The standardness axioms are the same as in [7] . They are also the same as in [2] with exception of the second one which does not exist there. The second standardness axiom has a clear meaning in type 0, namely that the nonstandard natural numbers are an end-extension of the standard natural numbers (cf. [?, p. 12]). For variables of higher types the meaning is not so clear and we discuss one of its consequences in the next subsection.
Bounded nonstandard realizability
In order to define the bounded nonstandard realizability we need the notion of ∃ st -free formula. These formulas have a role similar the one of∃-free formulas in [8] which by its turn reminds the well-known notion of ∃-free formula, with the difference that both∃ st -free and∃-free formulas also allow disjunctions. 
For the remaining cases, if we have already interpretations for Φ and Ψ given (respectively) by∃
From the interpretation given above one derives:
bn is Φ bn and they are both equivalent to Φ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the∃ st -free formula Φ.
The following four principles play an important role in the sequel. Indeed we show that these are the characteristic principles of our realizability notion. The proper formulation of the first three principles should be with tuples of variables. To ease readability, we formulate them with single variables.
III. Independence of Premises
where A is an∃ st -free formula.
where Φ is an arbitrary formula (it may have free variables). Then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types such that
• E-HA
The proof is by induction on length of the derivation of Φ.
Logical axioms are dealt with in a way similar to [8] .
We turn now to the standardness axioms. The interpretations of the first two axioms are∃
, respectively. It is clear that the term λc.c does the job. Let t be a closed monotone term. The interpretation of the third standardness axiom asks for a closed monotone term q such that E-HA ω st proves t ≤ * q, which follows from Howard's majorizability theorem. The interpretation of the fourth standardness axiom is
Clearly the term λc, b.cb does the job.
We turn now to the characteristic principles. Let us consider the monotone axiom of choice. The interpretation of∀
and the interpretation of∃
Then we need to find a closed monotone term t such that for all monotone standard g we havẽ
Let t be λg, c.gc and take arbitrary monotone standard terms g and c. Take f := tg. Note that f x = (tg) x = gx. By hypothesis one has∀x ≤ * x∃y ≤ * gx Φ bn (gx, x, y).
We now consider realization. Modulo equivalence in E-HA ω st we have that (∀x∃ st y Φ(x, y))
. So, we must find a closed monotone term t such that for all monotone standard c we have
Let c be standard and monotone. Clearly the term t := λc.c does the job by making z = c.
We turn now to the independence of premises. Let Ψ be an∃ st -free formula.
Modulo equivalence in E-HA
and that ∃st y A →∃z ≤ * y Ψ(z)
we must show that there exists a closed monotone term t such that for all monotone standard c we have
Let t := λc.c. Fix c such that c is standard and monotone. Assume
The majorizability axioms are∃ st -free and therefore have straightforward interpretations.
Theorem 2 (Characterization). Let Φ be an arbitrary formula (possibly with free variables). Then
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of Φ. If Φ is internal and atomic there is nothing to prove. If Φ is st(x) then Φ → Φ bn by MAJ ω and Φ bn → Φ by the second standardness axiom.
If Φ is A ∧ B or A ∨ B the result is obvious.
Then, by monotonicity∀
Then, by mAC ω and monotonicitỹ
If Φ is ∃xA (x), the result is obvious.
If Φ is ∀xA (x), by R ω and monotonicity 
Intuitionistic nonstandard functional interpretation
The following six principles play an important role in the sequel. The proper formulation of the first five principles should be with tuples of variables. To ease readability, we formulate them with single variables.
I. Monotone Choice mAC
ω :∀ st x∃ st y Φ(x, y) →∃ st f∀ st x∃y ≤ * f x Φ(x, y). II. Realization R ω : ∀x∃ st y Φ(x, y) →∃ st z∀x∃y ≤ * z Φ(x, y). III. Idealization I ω :∀ st z∃x∀y ≤ * z φ (x, y) → ∃x∀ st y φ (x, y).
IV. Independence of Premises
where Φ is of the form∀ st x φ (x, y).
We show that the standard version LLPO st of the well known lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO is a consequence of Idealization.
Clearly LLPO st implies the bounded version LLPOs t .
(4.1) 
This implies
Then by (I
In E-HA ω st , one has n = 0 ∨ n = 0, because n has type 0. If n = 0, then one concludes
Proposition 3. In E-HA ω st , the principle LLPO st in type 0 is equivalent to
Proof. In type 0 the principle LLPO st states that
It is enough to show that
For the direct implication just put m ′ = m and n′ = n. Assume ∀ st m, n (φ (m) ∨ ψ (n)). Let m, n be standard. We show first, by external induction on n, that
If n = 0 then φ (m) ∨ ψ (0) is true by hypothesis. By hypothesis one has φ (m) ∨ ψ (n + 1) because if n is standard then n+1 is also standard. Then, by the induction hypothesis, φ (m) ∨ ∀n 
Proof. The proof follows closely the argument given in [9, Proposition 3] . Let c be standard and monotone. Assume that∀
.
Taking z := c, we obtain∃ st f∀z ≤ * c∃y ≤ * f c Φ(y, z). Since f and c are standard, by the fourth standardness axiom f c is also standard. Then, by MAJ ω , there exists a standard b such that f c ≤ * b.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Suppose that
• E-HA ω st + mAC ω + R ω + I ω + MP st + IP ω ∀ st + MAJ ω ⊢ Φ,
where Φ is an arbitrary formula (it may have free variables). Then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types such that
Proof. The proof is by induction on length of the derivation of Φ. The standardness axioms have the same interpretations as in the realizability case above. The verifications that deserve special attention are the ones dealing with disjunction and the characteristic principles. A ∨ A → A. Since all closed terms are standard, to interpret this axiom we need to find closed monotone terms q, r and s such that for all monotone standard b, d and v we havẽ
The terms q :
To interpret A → A ∨ B we must find closed monotone terms q, r, s such that for all monotone standard a, b and v we have
Clearly, the terms q := λb, a, v.a, r := λb.b and s := λb.O do the job. A ∨ B → B ∨ A. We need to find closed monotone terms q, r, s, t such that for all monotone standard b, d, z and w we havẽ
The terms q := λb, d, z, w.w; r := λb, d, z, w.z,; s := λb, d.d and t := λb, d.b do the job.
Suppose we have monotone terms q, r such that
We need to find closed monotone terms s, t, u, v such that for all monotone standard b, d, z and w we havẽ
We show that the terms s := λb, d, z, w.z; t := λb, d, z, w.qdw; u := λb, d.b and v := λb, d.rd do the job. Fix monotone standard b, d, z and w. Assume that
In particular,∀
. By hypothesis we conclude the result.
We turn now to the characteristic principles.
and the interpretation of∃ st f∀ st x∃y ≤ * f x Φ(x, y) is
Hence we need to find closed monotone terms s, t, u and v such that for all monotone standard f , g, a and c we havẽ
We can take s := λf, g, a, c.a; t := λf, g, a, c.c; u := λf and v := λg, a ′ .g.
Hence we need to find closed monotone terms q, r and s such that for all monotone standard a, b and c we havẽ
The terms q := λa, b, c.c, r := λa, b.a, s := λa, b.b do the job. I ω . Modulo equivalence in E-HA ω st , the interpretation of∀ st z∃x∀y ≤ * z φ (x, y) is ∀ st z∃x∀y ≤ * z φ (x, y) and the interpretation of ∃x∀ st y φ (x, y) is
Hence the same terms satisfy both interpretations.
and the interpretation of∃ st y Φ →∃z ≤ * y Ψ(z) is
Hence we need to find closed monotone terms q, r, s and t such that for all monotone standard f , g, h and c we havẽ
The terms q := λf, g, h, c.c, r := λf, g, h.g, s := λf, g, h, c ′′ .h and t := λf, g, h, c ′′ .f do the job by putting
Then we need to find a closed monotone term t such that
It is easy to see that t := λb.b does the job.
Theorem 4 (Characterization). Let Φ be an arbitrary formula (possibly with free variables). Then
Proof. If Φ is internal and atomic the result is obvious. If Φ is st (x). Assume Φ then one concludes Φ Ist by MAJ ω . Assume Φ Ist . Then Φ follows from the second standardness axiom.
If Φ is A ∧ B the result is obvious.
By (4.1) this is equivalent to
If Φ is A → B. One has, modulo equivalence in E-HA
The principles (TP ∀ ) and (TP ∃ ) are classically (but not intuitionistically) equivalent. As we shall see, in both classic and intuitionistic settings, adding any of the Transfer principles to finiteness theories lead to nonconservativeness and adding any of the Transfer principles to majorizability theories leads to inconsistency.
Alternatively, Moerdijk [13] suggested to use Transfer as a rule instead of a principle. One needs to add the following two rules:
This elegant solution allows to incorporate Transfer in the theory and was followed by other authors, for example Van Transfer and finiteness. We start by discussing the transfer principles in the setting of Benno et al. (cf. [2] for the notation). As discussed in the appendix of [7] (see also [3] ), in the classical setting, adding either of the transfer principles to E-PA ω * st + I + HAC int leads to a nonconservative extension of PA
1
. However, as shown in [3] , a conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic can still be obtained by restricting (TP ∀ ) to the following parameter-free version
where the internal formula ϕ (x) does not involve parameters. But, even in this restricted version, Transfer has undesirable consequences, namely instances of the law of excluded middle and is therefore unsuitable for intuitionistic purposes. For example, the existence of type 0 nonstandard elements together with (TP ∀ ) implies the law of excluded middle for internal arithmetical formulas (see the discussion in [2, Section 3.3] for more details). In both [3] and the appendix of [7] the argument used to prove nonconservativeness uses, in an essential way, a strong form of the law of excluded middle and is therefore nonconstructive. However it is also possible to prove nonconservativeness in the intuitionistic setting, i.e., that adding any of the two Transfer principles to E-HA It had already been pointed out by Avigad and Helzner [1] that the combination of any of the transfer principles with (US 0 ) leads to a nonconservative extension of HA (see also [2, p. 1973] Transfer and majorizability. In the context of (nonstandard) majorizability theories, both (TP ∀ ) and (TP ∃ ) are incompatible with the second standardness axiom. Therefore none of the Transfer principles can be consistently added to any extension of Heyting (or Peano) arithmetic which possesses the second standardness axiom. In particular, neither (TP ∀ ) nor (TP ∃ ) can be added to the theory in [7] . Also, neither of these principles can be added to the bounded realizability presented in Section 3 or to the intuitionistic nonstandard interpretation presented in Section 4. To see this, let a be a nonstandard natural number and let α be the sequence defined by α (n) 0, if n < a 1, if n ≥ a .
By the second standardness axiom α is standard because α ≤ * 1. Then α(n) = 0 is an internal formula. We have that, for all standard n, α (n) = 0 and ¬ (∀n (α (n) = 0)) hence the second standardness axiom is incompatible with (TP ∀ ). Moreover, the element a is unique because it can be defined as the smallest element α (n) such that α (n) = 1. Observe that this would imply that a is standard, a contradiction. Hence the second standardness axiom is also incompatible with (TP ∃ ).
